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2008 and Current
Situation
- January
'08, the Sudanese government appointed the controversial Darfurian/Arab
militia leader, Musa Hilal, as special advisor to the minister of
governmental affairs
▪
He is a man referred to as the "poster child for Janjaweed atrocities in
Darfur" by Richard Dicker of Human Rights Watch.
▪ Hilal
has admitted to recruiting local Janjaweed militias and rights groups
that allege that Hilal ran training camps and was present for several
raids on Darfur villages.
▪
El Bashir's appointment of Hilal is viewed as another way to thwart the
already fragile peace process
International Criminal Court against President Bashir
- On
July 14, 2008, the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor Luis
Moreno- Ocampo requested that the court issue an arrest warrant against
Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir for the following:
▪
Several accounts of genocide
▪
Crimes against humanity
▪
War crimes for the government’s role in implementing genocidal violence
in Darfur
▪
For “masterminding and implementing” a strategy that intended to destroy
three ethnic groups in Darfur: the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masaalit.
- This
is the first time, the ICC prosecutor has requested charges against
a sitting head of state
- The
Sudanese Government claims that it will resist the ICC and that
President Bashir is innocent
-
Tension in Sudanese Politics are high, which may hamper humanitarian
efforts, peace negotiations, and even disturb the UN peacekeeping
force
- The ICC
continues to review evidence and is deciding whether or not to
issue the warrant
Sudanese Politics:
-
Political settlement remains distant
- The
National Congress Party (NCP) in Khartoum denies the gravity of the
situation and continues to carry out destructive policies in
Darfur:
▪
Resisting key provisions in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
that ended the North-South Civil War
▪
Resettling key allies on cleared land
▪
Defying Security Council resolutions by integrating its Janjaweed
soldiers into official security structures instead of disarming them
- The Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA) has failed because
▪
The government and few rebel factions that have signed are
hampering the peace process
▪
The new strategy is difficult for the African Union to cope with
▪
Rebel DPA signatories, specifically the Sudan Liberation Army faction of
Minni Minawai, continue attacking civilians, humanitarians, the AU
mission (AMIS), and IDP camps
◦
Continuing corruption, these Rebel DPA Signatories has also
attained government jobs and land as supporters
of the
government’s status quo.
**
Consequently, peace talks with the Sudanese Government have been put on
hold.
UNAMID’s
Role
- The Hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping force in Darfur (UNAMID) is
failing to stabilize the region with security
▪
On July 8, 2008, the worst attack was done against UNAMID
◦
Approximately 200 gunmen on horseback and in SUVS ambushed
UNAMID
peacekeeping force in a North Darfur State
- UNAMID lacks the resources, staff, and troops
▪
It is only equipped with 10,000 personnel of the 26,000 announced
▪ As of mid-March, a
hybrid AU-UN peacekeeping force of 7,000 out of 26,000 has been deployed
- The
mission is continually hampered by the Sudanese government and its
internal challenges
- The
UNAMID must
▪
Be more pro-active in protecting civilians and responding to cease-fire
violations
▪
Engage itself in international peace talks
▪
Attain more financial and diplomatic support from the international
community against ceasefire violations and a humanitarian crisis
Continued Violence
- The
violence has become multi-dimensional
▪
Rebel groups oppose the Sudanese government, but also fight amongst each
other over for territorial regions and are growing in number.
▪ Paramilitary
forces exert their independence from Khartoum
▪ Hostility
between Chad and Sudan is increasing
- The
Sudanese Government and their proxy militia, the Janjaweed, returned to
the violent tactics that they used between 2003 and 2005
- Insecurity has increased the number of displaced persons.
▪
2.7 million Darfurians live in refugee camps (90,000 more than in 2005)
▪
Although the number of deaths has decreased, 75,000 Darfurian civilians
have been displaced since the beginning of 2008
- The
region continues to have conflict amongst government forces, proxy
militias, rebels, and bandits
▪
The Sudanese government launched major aerial bombardments and ground
attacks in West Darfur, during February 2008
◦
In reaction, in May, Darfurian rebels of the Justice and Equality
Movement
(JEM) attacked government soldiers in Omdurman, a suburb of Khartoum
(the 1st military strike against the capital in 30 years)
◦ Consequently, Khartoum accused Chad of assisting the JEM rebels in an
attempted coup and reacted with attacks against civilians and JEM rebels
- The IDP
camps are increasingly violent because they are surrounded by danger
- Additionally, internal conflict in Arab tribes is adding new volatility
▪
The NCP refuses to guarantee their long-term interests.
▪
Consequently, the Arab tribes are now taking matters into their own
hands.
▪ This
conflict may lead to an Arab insurgency and its alliances with non-Arab
rebel groups.
Continuing Threat at Chad-Darfur Border
- This humanitarian crisis is linked to the increase of
violence in the border between Chad and Sudan
▪
On February 2, 2008, Chadian rebels attacked Chad’s capital
of N’djamena after a French-led EU force was due to deploy to
the Chad-Sudan border
- Although
the Sudanese President al-Bashir and Chadian President Idriss Deby
signed peace agreement to end support for rebel groups in the region,
cross-border violence is killing and displacing both Chadian and
Sudanese civilians
What Actions Are Necessary?
- Broadening international participation in the peace talks
- International efforts towards increasing the number of troops and
providing resources to the peacekeeping forces in
- Attacking the root causes of the humanitarian crisis in the Darfur
Darfur Dialogue:
▪
Land tenure and use
▪
Grazing rights
▪
Role and reform of the local government and administrative structures
- Social
institutions as the Ceasefire Commission, Judicial Court, the UN, AMIS,
AMID, and AU must
▪
Establish penalties against violators of human rights and
the Ceasefire agreement
▪
Monitor the Chad-Sudan border
▪ Attempt diplomacy by convincing the Sudanese government to
cooperate ▪ Protect civilians, IDP camp refugees, and displaced
individuals
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